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US Intervention in Russia 1918-1920: the Forgotten Mutiny
Austin Lee (Department of History)
Matthew Loayza, Faculty Mentor (Department of History)
After Russia withdrew from WWI, the Allied nations worried about Germany relocating
its eastern front forces to the western front. Britain and France both urged the United States to
militarily intervene in Russia to reopen the eastern front. Although President Wilson initially
ignored this proposition of the Allied nations, he reconsidered in 1918 and ordered troops to
Russia. Many scholars have examined the US intervention in Russia and debated why Wilson
decided to use American troops in Russia. The preoccupation among historians as to why these
troops were sent to Russia has caused them to overlook the underlying reasons the intervention
failed. Sparked by the alleged 1919 mutiny in North Russia, Wilson was forced to consider
withdrawing troops from Russia, which eventually occurred in 1920. With the withdrawal of U.S
troops, the intervention in North Russia proved to be unsuccessful because Wilson gave British
commanders control over U.S. troops, he refused to send reinforcements to north Russia, and he
refused to define the ultimate goal of the expeditionary force, which ultimately crippled
American troop morale.
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President Ronald Reagan announced in 1984, "To the people of the Soviet Union, it's true
that our governments have had serious differences. But our sons and daughters have never fought
each other in war. And if we Americans have our way, they never will."1 The president had
ignored the history of the Polar Bear Mission where United States soldiers indeed fought and
died on the battlefield in North Russia against the Soviets between the years 1918 and 1919. A
small army of 5000 US soldiers landed in the ports of Archangel and Murmansk in fall of 1918.
In a New York Times poll in 1985, only 14 percent of Americans knew that troops landed in
Russia. These facts show that over the past 90 years, the Polar Bear mission has been forgotten
and muddled in history.
The events that led up to the U.S. intervention in Russia started after the United States
entered WWI. Shortly after the U.S. joined the war effort, Russia withdrew its forces because of
the Russian civil war where the Bolsheviks claimed victory. After much negotiation, the
Germans and Russians, signed the peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which gave Germany much
land and raw resources. With German reinforcements now able to transfer from the eastern front
to the western front, the Allies became concerned about their western front positions.2 Britain
and France concluded under these new conditions the Allies must establish an eastern front
through a military intervention in Russia, and in June, the Supreme War Council recommended
sending a joint allied force to Murmansk and Archangel Russia.3 The Allied commanders
concluded that the ice free ports of Murmansk and Archangel held great strategic importance
because of their location near the railroad system, which connected these cities to Petrograd.
1

David S. Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 19171920 (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 26.
2
Ibid, 15.
3
Leonid Strakhovsky, “The Allies and the Supreme Administration of the Northern Region August 2-October7.
1918. A Page in the History of Allied Intervention in North Russia,” The American Association for the Advancement
of Slavic Studies 1 (1941): 102.

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2011

3

Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato, Vol. 11 [2011], Art. 4

They believed that possession of these ports would enable Allied forces to reopen the eastern
front.
While Britain and France asserted the necessity of an Allied intervention in Russia,
President Wilson argued that the United States should not interfere in Russia. He proclaimed in
his Fourteen Points Speech that all foreign governments should allow Russia an "opportunity for
the independent determination of her own political development and national policy."4 Shortly
thereafter, Wilson further expressed his opposition to a military intervention in Russia when he
stated that the establishment of an eastern front "would be merely a method of making use of
Russia, not a method of serving her."5 President Wilson believed that the Allies should allow a
democratic Russian government to form. Paradoxically, although President Wilson fervently
opposed American intervention in Russia, he later ordered an American expeditionary force of
over four thousand men to land on the frontiers of Russia where they would engage the Soviet
forces.
While Wilson intended to allow the Russian people to decide their own political future,
his advisors persuaded him that the Germans had installed the Soviets into power and that the
United States should in turn send an "experimental" probe of U.S. soldiers to Russia to spark a
Russian uprising against the Soviets.6 This experimental probe proved to be unsuccessful
because he gave British commanders control over U.S. troops, refused to send reinforcements to
north Russia, and he refused to define the ultimate goal of the expeditionary force, which
ultimately crippled American troop morale.

4

Woodrow Wilson, “Wilson Proclaims U.S War Aims: The Fourteen Points, 1918” in Major Problems in American
Foreign Relations, ed. Dennis Merrill (Boston: Wadsworth, 2005), 32.
5
Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism, 202.
6
PRFA, 1918, Supplement on Russia, Vol. II, pp. 287-290.
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Many scholars have looked into the apparent hypocrisy of Wilson's Fourteen Points
address in light of his actions in North Russia, but they have not come to a consensus as to why
Wilson ultimately ordered the intervention. George Kennan, in his 1958 piece Decision to
Intervene, claimed that Wilson never really understood the events that took place in Russia.7
Moreover, Betty Unterberger in her work Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks "The Acid Test of
Soviet-American Relations," argued that Wilson had no idea that American troops engaged
Bolshevik forces and that he only agreed to send troops to North Russia as a way to appease
coalition diplomacy.8
Kennan's and Unterberger work came under scrutiny when revisionists such as William
Appleman claimed in his American Intervention in Russia, 1917-1920 that anti- Bolshevik
sentiment drove Wilson's decision for a military intervention.9 George Schild added support to
this argument when he asserted that Wilsonian policy "alternated between ideological
preconceptions and considerations of realpolitik."10 Further, David Foglesong wrote in America's
Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 that
Wilson's Puritan upbringing gave him a natural disdain for the Bolsheviks. He asserted that a
"Wilsonian style of intervention" used clandestine measures in an attempt to cripple the
Bolshevik government, which ultimately failed.11 This "Wilsonian style of intervention"
stemmed from Wilson's experience with the intervention in the Mexican revolutionary war,
where he waged military and economic warfare against Mexico. Most scholars have concluded
that George Kennan's groundwork about the intervention was important; however, revisionists
7

George Frost Kennan, The Decision to Intervene: Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920, vol. 2 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989).
8
Betty Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks "The Acid Test of Soviet-American Relations,"
Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987):71.
9
David McFadden, “Did Wilson Have a Russia Policy?” The Johns Hopkins University Press 24, no. 4 (1996): 624.
10
Ibid.
11
Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism.
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such as Appleman, Schild, and Foglesong concluded that Wilson did in fact create a policy on
the intervention in North Russia, which now most historians accept.
While some historians believed that U.S. military intervention in North Russia went
against Wilson's belief of self-determination, Wilson himself declared otherwise. Wilson
approved the military intervention because he believed that the Bolsheviks power stemmed from
German agents and that the Soviets did not represent the Russian people. Providing evidence that
Germany meddled in Russian political affairs, Edgar Sisson, U.S Committee on Public
Information officer stationed in Petrograd, Russia, informed President Wilson that "the present
leaders of the Russian Bolshevik government were installed by Germany."12 Ambassador
Francis, the last ambassador to czarist Russia and a wealthy businessmen, lent support to these
allegations when he wrote to the Secretary of State, "[I have seen] evidence that the Soviet
government submits to German demands without protest and am almost convinced that Lenin
and possibly Trotsky are pliable tools if not responsive German agents."13 General Poole further
proclaimed in order to restore democracy in Russia the Soviet government should dissolve,
which would enable allied forces to expel German influence in Russia.14 These reports helped
convince President Wilson that the Bolshevik government was an unrepresentative government
installed by a hostile power.15
In addition to claiming that the Germans nefariously imposed themselves into Russian
politics, American political figures in Russia provided evidence to Wilson that the Russian
people fervently hated the Soviets and yearned for a new government. Ambassador Francis

12

Ibid., 199.
Francis to Secretary of State, May 23, 1918, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Pt. I:538.
14
Poole to Secretary of State, May 24, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia, I:540.
15
Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism,190.
13
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predicted that the Russian people would indeed support a U.S. intervention when he wrote to
Washington that, "Information from all sources demonstrates dissatisfaction with the Soviets and
indicates that [an] Allied intervention would be welcomed by [the] Russian people."16 Three
days later, Francis reported that the head of the Greek Church in Russia had claimed that the
church would support a new government revision of the Brest Treaty.17 With one of the larger
Church organizations in Russia aligning against the Soviets, the conversation lent credence to the
idea that the Soviet government did not represent the Russian people. These depictions of
Russian sentiment helped Wilson conclude that an Allied intervention in Russia would lead to an
anti-Bolshevik movement among the Russian people, and in turn, help facilitate selfdetermination in Russia. Secretary of State Robert Lansing stated this as the U.S. policy towards
Russia:
In the view of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to befriend the
Russian people and lend them all possible assistance in their struggle to reconstruct their
nation upon principles of democracy and self-government.18
To the disdain of Lenin, an agreement between the local Murmansk Soviet government
and the Allies on July 6, 1918 for an Allied expedition landing finally pushed Wilson to back a
U.S. intervention in Russia.19 Lenin angrily telegraphed the Murmansk Soviets about the deal
with England by stating, "[England's] direct intention is overthrowing the workmen's and
peasants power."20 Still being attacked by the Germans after the Brest-Litovsk treaty the Soviet
Murmansk government replied, "It is all very well for you to talk that way, sitting there in

16

Francis to Secretary of State, May 21, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia, I:538.
Francis to Secretary of State, May 24, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia, I:540.
18
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-33.2.
19
Halliday, When Hell Froze Over, 27.
20
Ibid., 26.
17
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Moscow."21 Wilson believed that this agreement between the English and Murmansk
government formally showed that the Russian people invited foreign troops in Russia. However,
uncertain of how vigorous the Russian people would respond to an Allied intervention, Wilson
commented that he initiated a limited "experimental" military operation.22 On March 18, Wilson
declared:
The United States will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more
complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs ... the whole heart of the
people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves
forever from autocratic government and become makers of their own fate.23
President Wilson thoroughly believed it would help the Russian people by providing Allied
troops to North Russia, and thus he was being consistent with the ideals that he proclaimed in his
Fourteen-Point address or his March 18 speech.
Although the Murmansk Soviet government had invited the Allies to North Russia, the
British nevertheless planned to overthrow the local Soviets upon their arrival and install a
democratic government. The British government sent funds to Commander George E. Chaplin of
the Russian Navy to organize a counter-revolution in Archangel.24 The British hoped that on
August 2, 1918 when British General Poole arrived in Archangel, an uprising against the current
Soviet government would occur. After the Soviets heard of the British intent to plan an uprising,
the Soviets evacuated the city and fled south along the Dvina River.25
British efforts to overthrow the local Soviet government provided Chaplin with the
opportunity to organize a replacement government. Chaplin promised the British he would select
21

Ibid.
PRFA, 1918, Supplement on Russia, Vol. II, pp. 287-290.
23
Halliday, When Hell Froze Over, 23.
24
Strakhovsky, “The Allies and the Supreme," 103.
25
Ibid.
22
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a democratic government that held openly pro-Allied views. Chaplin appointed a veteran
socialist member of the "Union for the Regeneration of Russia" Nicholas V. Chaikovski. The
new government quickly made a public announcement to the townspeople in Archangel,
proclaiming, "The provisional government comes into existence under unique circumstances at a
time when war is being waged against the Bolsheviks and Germans."26 The proclamation
asserted an anti Bolshevik sentiment, which fulfilled the British demands for the new
government to hold pro-Allied views.
Although the Allies were satisfied with the Provisional Government's anti-Bolshevik
views, problems with the government occurred before the United States expeditionary force
arrived in North Russia. These problems centered on Chaikovski and his leadership. The Allied
commanders complained that Chaikovksi refused to, "realize that his government very existence
depended upon military support of the Allies."27 In addition to Chaikovski's arrogant style of
governance, the Allied governments worried that most of the provisional government members
were socialists.28 This ideological conflict then transformed into disputes over which group held
ultimate authority between the Allied commanders and the provisional government. For
example, the issuing of red flags across Archangel drew stern criticism from the Allied
commanders. General Poole wrote to Chaikovski about removing the red flags; however,
Chaikovski replied explaining why he used red flags. General Poole sternly replied, "I have the
honor to inform you that the city of Archangel as well as the whole province are at present under
martial law... Therefore I have given orders to the military not to permit any display of red flags

26

Ibid.
Ibid., 109.
28
Ibid., 106
27
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in Archangel."29 Through these letters, General Poole asserted his role as the chief commander of
the Allied forces in Archangel and demonstrated his power was greater than Chaikovski.
Allied suspicions about Chakiovksi prompted them to diminish his role as the head of the
provisional government. Ambassador Francis commented, "The president [Chakiovksi] is a
theorist, if not a dreamer."30 This pointed out that Chakiovksi did not hold pragmatist views
about the problems his government faced. In turn, the Allies appointed a military governor to
reduce the role of Chakiovksi to gain hold of the situation.31 The British government went a step
further when it attempted a coup; however, the coup failed and Chakiovksi remained in power.32
Upon the arrival of American troops, Chaikovksi remained in power, and the troops
received a warm reception. A colonel of the U.S. Army J.A Ruggles commented, “The
Bolshevik forces had fled from Archangel and the populace was waiting for us."33 A U.S. naval
captain noted upon arrival that the populace "simply went wild with joy to an extent almost
beyond imagination."34 In addition, C.T. Williams, Deputy Commissioner of the Red Cross,
commented that peasants in North Russia generally viewed President Wilson favorably. The U.S
troop's positive relations with the Russians would prove to be short lived after military
operations against the Bolsheviks commenced.
The positive feeling of American troops after their landing in North Russia quickly
dissipated after Colonel George E. Stewart received orders from Washington to report to British

29

Ibid.
Ibid.
31
Ibid., 107.
32
Ibid.
33
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-33.6.
34
Halliday, When Hell Froze Over, 38.
30
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General Poole.35 President Wilson allowed the supreme war council to declare that British
commanders would command the northern Russian expeditionary force. President Wilson
believed that if the British commanded the troops, his political accountability in the expedition
could be minimized. This political decision led the U.S. troops and commanders to become
quickly discouraged by the situation in Russia after the realization that the British commanded
the entire North Russian Expeditionary Force. American Captain Martin commented that the
"American troops in Russia had been loaned to the British for a certain period of time." He
further stated that the day the American troops left Russia they would gain their American
freedoms back.36 In the historical account of the Polar Mission, Lieutenant Lewis Janis noted that
coupled with the frustration that the British General had overall command of the expeditionary
force, a general belief among the American troops was that, “Many of the British officers were
decorated with insignia of high rank but drew pay of low rank. It was done over and over again
to give the British officer ranking authority over the American officers.”37 This showed the
general sentiment concerning British officers commanding American officers did not settle well
with American troops.
In addition to U.S. commanders reporting to British commanders, the British ordered the
American troops to the frontlines where the brunt of the battles occurred, which created ill
feelings towards the British. C.T. Williams, reported, "The British high command has distributed
the Allied Forces at nearly all the positions in which fighting with the Bolsheviks is likely to

35

Ibid., 45.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-36.1.
37
Jahns, The History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki Campaigning in North Russia 1918-1919,
17.
36
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occur."38 He portrayed the British command as putting American troops in the fiercest battles
against the Bolsheviks instead of the British, creating harsh resentment among the American
troops. A soldier from the Ambulance Company, Waggoner Weimiester, stated, "The British, we
all hated, and I mean everybody."39 Weimiester showed that American troops resented the
British. This resentment would create a low morale amongst the U.S. troops as they anguished
over the losses of American soldiers under British command.
In addition to the belief that American troops fought most of the battles against the
Bolsheviks, many American troops thought the British commanders inefficiently managed the
troops. According to Williams, "The allied forces in North Russia have been seriously
mismanaged because of the inefficiency of the British."40 Further, Colonel Ruggles reported,
"several of these British officers have been grossly inefficient."41 Lieutenant Mead worried that
the British disregarded the safety of American troops. He commented:
Allied intelligence was certain a larger force lurked nearby in the vast Arctic forest, and a
strong attack was expected. In spite of this knowledge, British command had ordered A
Company, without reinforcements, to hold the sector at all cost.42
Ruggles concluded that the British leadership created "friction" between the U.S troops and the
British. This mismanagement of the troops created harsh tensions amongst the Allied forces and
ultimately affected U.S. troop morale.
The friction between American troops and British commanders extended to a national
level. Although President Wilson "gambled" that he could limit the expeditionary force to a
38

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1.
39
Quartered in Hell, 181.
40
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1.
41
Ibid.
42
Quartered in Hell, 181.
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supportive role until the anti-Bolshevik forces gathered around the Allied "nucleus,"43 this wager
failed when the British began to pursue their own objectives in North Russia. British leaders
planned to expand their military expedition to the southeast in order to connect the
Czechoslovakian forces to North Russia.44 David Foglesong asserted through his research that
President Wilson "exploded" with anger when he learned that the Allied forces had been sent
southern the Ural Mountains.45 American General Tasker Bliss believed that the British planned
for a more aggressive intervention.46 Although President Wilson gambled wrong about British
policy in North Russia, he refused to withdraw American troops because of the fear that he
would appear to alienate his allies during the war.47
In addition to the British offensive strategy in Russia disturbing President Wilson,
American troops looked upon the British strategy with great skepticism. The U.S. troops thought
President Wilson sent them to take a defensive position in Archangel and secure munitions
supplies under direct threat from German forces. However, after marching 200 miles south of
Archangel, Ruggles commented, "[U.S. troops] believe that they are being used to further selfish
designs of England upon Russian territory and resources."48 American soldiers believed that the
British used the mask of creating an eastern front in order to pursue imperialistic goals.
Weimeister commented in his diary, "There were no supplies. Actually the British wanted to
occupy and conquer the state of North Russia in order to obtain the pine from the forests."49
These comments reflected the great disdain U.S. troops held for the British leadership in North
43

Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism,209.
Ibid., 205.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., 209.
47
Betty Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks "The Acid Test of Soviet-American Relations,"
Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987):71.
48
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1.
49
Quartered in Hell, 179.
44
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Russia. The skepticism of U.S. troops prompted Ruggles to fear that U.S. troops might refuse to
obey their British commanders. He opined, "At the time grave doubts were expressed by many of
our officers that orders for aggressive operations would be obeyed."50
The U.S. expeditionary force began to doubt if fighting the Bolsheviks really helped the
war effort against Germany. Although great doubt rippled through the American troops, British
General Poole devised an aggressive strategy to deploy Allied forces down south through the
Trans Siberian railroad. He assumed the Red Army comprised of starving peasants and the North
Russian people "would rally behind the Allies."51 With these assumptions, he hoped the Russians
in Archangel and Murmansk would create a massive volunteer army led by the new provisional
government. This volunteer army would bolster the relatively small Allied in Russia. However
realities on the ground proved to contradict General Poole's assumptions. In actuality, the Red
Army resisted Allied forces instead of deserting, the North Russian people did rise en masse
against the Bolsheviks, and the Allied force was too small to push its forces to Petrograd without
American reinforcements. The British commander reluctantly retreated back to Archangel and
Murmansk. This provided for a long winter as American troops wondered why they were
fighting the Bolsheviks instead of the Germans, and President Wilson's had refused to send
appropriate reinforcements.
The British's initial offensive strategy proved to be successful against the unorganized
and ill equipped Soviet army. A United States intelligence report revealed that food shortages
and starvation threatened the entire Soviet Union.52 This made U.S. officials to believe that in
50

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1.
51
Halliday, When Hell Froze Over, 39.
52
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1.
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Petrograd the people started to turn anti-Bolshevik.53 Allied officials observed the food rations of
the Soviet army were grossly inferior to the Allied rations.54 These reports suggested to the
Allied commanders that the expeditionary force could take advantage of the dire situation in
Russia and collapse the Soviet government.
The Soviet army also faced shortages in necessary raw materials such as coal, which
ultimately crippled the mobility of the Red Army. An extract from the Bolshevik Press stated,
"The Riga Orlow Railway has stopped all goods traffic owing to shortage of coal."55
Furthermore, in densely populated Petrograd, trains stopped running due to coal shortages and
many of the towns lost electricity.56 The frequent stoppages in the railway system led the Allies
to conclude that movement of Soviet reinforcements to the front would be difficult to
accomplish. Moreover, with the lack of raw materials the Soviet Union army itself faced low
morale problems.57 Allied intelligence confirmed that low amounts of essential resources pushed
the Soviet army to the cusp of defeat. A U.S. intelligence report stated, "The Bolsheviks in
Petrograd are showing signs of nervousness. The Obukhow, Liteyney, Troitksy, and Nicolai
bridges have been mined."58 This showed that the Soviets expected the Allied offensive to reach
Petrograd as they prepared for a last defensive stand.
While the Allied offensive strategy appeared to have great success, the momentum of
Poole’s campaign stopped abruptly after the realization that there would not be enough troops to
support an Allied offensive down to Petrograd. Captain H.S. Martin of the United States Army

53

Ibid.
Ibid.
55
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-23.1.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
54
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later argued, "I believed then and believe now that a strong Allied assistance in North Russia
could have saved the entire situation... Our force was too small."59 The expeditionary force,
which Wilson sent as an "experimental" force, proved too small for an aggressive operation
against the Bolsheviks.
Although Wilson hoped that the Russian populace would gallantly support the small
expeditionary force, and fight the Bolsheviks, no massive volunteer Russian army evolved. The
lack of local populous support ultimately forced the Allied troops to take a defensive stand
against the struggling Soviets. A volunteer army did emerge after the expeditionary force landed
in Russia, it was severely disorganized and suffered major defections.60 General Stewart
commented that anti-communist Russian forces, "mutinied on two occasions and are generally
credited with being unreliable and have little sympathy with the allies."61 Captain Moore further
injected that the Russian troops were "liabilities" to the Allied effort. In effect, most of the Allied
commanders held suspicious views about the Russian soldiers because they worried that they
held Bolshevik views. After several field reports reached Newton Baker, Secretary of War, the
United States government declared on September 26 that, "no gathering of any effective forces
by the Russians is to be hoped for."62 After this date President Wilson would not send any
reinforcements for the cause of an Allied offensive. This military decision led to the
reorganization of Soviet forces and severely affected the morale of the United States troops.

59

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.4.
60
Ibid.
61
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-33.2.
62
Ibid.
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After the British commanders abandoned the offensive in North Russia, they adopted a
defensive position outside of Archangel and Murmansk which allowed the Soviets to re-group
gain strength and set up punishing long ranged artillery attacks on Allied positions.
The Bolsheviks used the foreign intervention as a propaganda tool to rally the Russian
people to its cause. C.T. Williams of the American Red Cross noted, "The presence of the Allied
Expedition in North Russia constitutes one of the strongest pillars of the Bolshevik
government."63 The Soviets used the foreign intervention as a tool to facilitate anger of the
Russian people against the Allied presence. For example, a leaflet handed out by the Soviets
labeled "Antanta" depicted Uncle Sam and British capitalists holding leashes of anti-Bolshevik
leaders.64 This propaganda for the Soviets proved successful, as the Soviet army grew stronger.
A U.S. military intelligence summary stated, "Within the last two months the whole Bolshevik
forces have been re-organized and a serious attempt is being made to create a large, welldisciplined army on a European model."65 Before long, the strengthened Soviet Army mounted
an offensive against the Allies. An Allied intelligence report worriedly stated, "[the] enemy is
systematically accumulating troops on all fronts with the view of a general offensive before the
thaw."66 Furthermore, the reinvigorated Soviet army bombarded Allied positions with long
ranged artillery.67
Throughout late 1918 and early 1919, Allied officials pleaded with President Wilson to
send reinforcements to Russia to counter the new Bolshevik offensive. The troops received
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constant bombardments of artillery from the Soviets and faced a very cold winter. The majority
of American troops stayed on the front lines and did not filter back to Archangel. General
Stewart sent an urgent letter to the Secretary of War stating, "The enemy are becoming more
numerous on all fronts and are more active. The allied command is small and we have no
reserves."68 Wilson's administration did not respond to the calls for reinforcements. Further pleas
by U.S military officials to the White House administration stated that knowledge of
reinforcements would "improve the morale of troops after their long winter."69 Moreover, the
British embassy in Russia made "urgent" appeals to the state department for reinforcements.70
While the military officers of the Allied forces requested reinforcements, President Wilson
maintained that the force should remain small in order to allow the Russian people to decide their
own political fate. While President Wilson remained steadfast in his determination to keep the
American Expedition Force small, Major Francis Riggs urged him to send reinforcements that
would allow, "General Poole to move to more populous regions where he could secure
volunteers."71 His refusal to heed this message depicted the ultimate shortcoming of Wilson's
policy of no reinforcements. With Wilson refusing to send more troops, it paralyzed any effort to
rally the Russian people against the Bolsheviks.
On November 11, 1918, the Germans surrendered to the Allies, however, the battle
against the Bolsheviks continued. With American troops coming home from the western front,
and the American Expeditionary force continuing to fight against the Bolsheviks an anxious U.S.
army waited to hear its official objective in Russia. Captain H.S Martin wrote:
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They [U.S. troops] stated that they were drafted to fight Germany, not the Bolsheviks.
That they had been sent here to guard supplies and not carry on aggressive warfare; that
after the signing of the Armistice with Germany their job was finished and if the
government wanted them to stay on and fight Bolshevism it should say so and announce
some definite policy regarding Russia.72
American troops expected that President Wilson would explain why they still were fighting in
North Russia, but to their dismay President Wilson fervently expressed to the press that the
United States was not at war with the Bolsheviks.73 Captain Ruggles wrote to General Pershing,
"The morale of our troop has been low since the signing of the armistice with Germany. The men
and some of the officers seem unable to understand why they should be kept in Russia after
fighting has stopped with Germany."74 These reports and letters depicted the American troop's
weariness of fighting Russia. With the question of why they fought in Russia, American troop
morale rapidly declined.
After the signing of the Armistice, Chicago and Detroit press, home to most members of
American Expeditionary force, depicted a dire situation in North Russia to their readers. The
majority of the sources used by the newspapers came from censored letters sent from the
soldiers. Usually, the newspapers published the exact letters in full.75 Moreover, sometimes the
journalist would interpret the letters and even exaggerate the harsh conditions. The newspapers
often produced political caricatures of the situation in North Russia. For example, after reports
that Allied forces were outnumbered six to one in some battles, the Chicago Tribune depicted a
large bear, symbolizing the Soviets, towering over a single American soldier.76 In addition, the
newspapers started to question why American troops were still fighting in Russia if the war was
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over. For instance, the Chicago Tribune published a cartoon that depicted two American soldiers
in Archangel asking each other, "Say when did we declare war on Russia?"77 Furthermore, an
editorial in the Chicago Tribune commented, "our men are dying for a cause, the purpose of
which they are no more certain than we in America. America has not declared war on Russia, but
Americans are killing Russians or are being killed by them."78 These editorials showed the
American people that President Wilson did not have a policy in North Russia and that the
American troops faced an enemy that outnumbered them.
After the U.S. troops read some of the national papers, it had a significant impact on the
American troop's morale. American troops became quickly discouraged about the object of their
mission. Many times newspapers received their information from Soviet propaganda, which in
turn predicted an ominous future for American troops. In the History of the American
Expeditionary Force, written by three members of the American expedition, they recalled that:
When a man's own home paper printed the same story [as Bolshevik propaganda] of the
million men advancing on Archangel with bloody bayonets fixed, and told the horrible
hardships the soldiers endured... many of them were indeed severe hardships although
most of the news stories were overdrawn and untruthful... the doughboy's spirit was
depressed.79
The American newspaper stories eventually circulated in Archangel, which ultimately hurt
American troop morale. After several months in battle against the Bolsheviks and reports from
papers of their ultimate demise, the United States troops faced questions of how long before their
positions would be overrun.
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With news coverage painting an increasingly negative picture of the Expeditionary forces
predicament, the local public the Midwest started to pressure their congressional representatives
to bring their boys back home, which led to a bill that failed to withdraw the troops from North
Russia. Republican house representative from Michigan J.M.C Smith read to the congress about
his constituents appeal to bring the troops back home.80 Furthermore, Republican Senator Hiram
Johnson of California took the lead to push for the return of the troops. Johnson sat on the Senate
Armed Forces committee and voted against declaring war on Germany. The senator pushed the
Secretary of State to reveal the actual objectives in Russia through a resolution, which ultimately
failed. Moreover, he argued on the Senate floor that the United States had not declared war on
Russia. Republican Senator Henry Lodge joined the effort for the call of the withdrawal of
American troops. He argued that the President did not send enough troops to North Russia at the
start and now that Germany surrendered, American troops should be brought home. On February
14, the Senate voted on the bill S.R. 444 to withdraw American troops. However, the bill voted
to a tie and the Vice President expectedly voted against the bill. The vote for the bill remained
along party lines, where the Democrats backed the President and the Republicans voted to
withdraw the troops.
After the Senate failed to pass the resolution to withdraw United States troops from North
Russia, American troops morale continued to decline which led to the alleged mutiny. On March
30, 1919, a United States Sergeant ordered four men to load their sleds and move to the front.
American Lieutenant May reported that the men refused to load their sleds and Captain Horatio
Winslow "immediately" called a meeting of the men.81 Colonel Stewart met the men at the local
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Y.M.C.A and talked to the soldiers. According to Lieutenant May, the soldiers complained that,
"They had never been supplied with an answer as to why they were there, but the Reds were
trying to push them into the White Sea and that they were fighting for their lives."82 After an
extended conversation, the men eventually agreed to move to the front, and Colonel Stewart
noted that he did not take any disciplinary action against any of the soldiers.83 While the event
seemed small and insignificant at the time, the official report to the Secretary of War was that a
mutiny had occurred in Archangel. This report would lead to a whirlwind of speculation among
the press and further the pressure on President Wilson to withdraw the United States troops.
After receiving reports from the War Department that a mutiny had occurred, the papers
published alarming accounts of the incident that created a backlash against the President's policy
in North Russia. On April 11, the Washington Post headline read, "U.S. TROOPS MUTINY ON
ARCHANGEL FRONT."84 This article noted that four soldiers had refused to go to the front and
predicted that a "general mutiny" would occur if the troops were not withdrawn immediately.85
The Washington Post claimed that four men started the mutiny while another 250 were
involved.86 The article depicted harsh conditions for United States soldiers, and further
questioned why the troops still fought in Russia after the armistice. The Chicago Tribune and
New York Times likewise overstated the significance of the event.
On the following day, the newspapers thrashed President Wilson for his policy in North
Russia. The editorials depicted families pleading in telegrams to Wilson to "immediately"
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withdraw American troops.87 Furthermore, the papers accused the British of censoring the
soldiers’ letters to home in order to conceal the harsh conditions in Russia.88 Moreover, the paper
criticized President Wilson for sending inadequate forces into Russia, and claimed that Wilson
had sent the American troops into a hopeless situation. These reports applied pressure on
President Wilson to withdraw the troops.
In response to the whirlwind of the press reports, Senator Johnson renewed his appeal to
withdraw the troops in order to gain political momentum against the League of Nations. Wilson
believed that collective security, managed by such a league, was the key to a lasting postwar
peace. Republican Senator Johnson stated his resentment against the British authority over
American troops to build his argument against a League of Nations. The Washington Post quoted
Johnson saying American troops faced, "harshness" from their British commanders. Moreover,
Johnson titled his response for an American withdrawal, "Lets be Americans Again."89 Johnson
stated that the administration's response about the status of American troops in North Russia was,
"in the hands of the allied council in Europe."90 In addition, he argued that a proxy League of
Nations already existed with the allied council. Finally, Johnson asserted that if the United States
joined the League of Nations, the U.S. would be drawn into conflicts like the one in Russia
without the assent of the American people:
This allied council is nothing but the existing league of nations. If the American people
desire war, let it be declared, and if declared by Congress, the soldiers sent to fight would
amply supported, but under the orders of foreign nations Americans wage war without
declaration by the American Congress or the consent of the American people.91
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Senator Johnson used the American people's anger about the Allied war effort in North Russia to
galvanize resistance to American membership in a League of Nations. Coupled with the
firestorm of anti-intervention reporting done by the media, Senator Johnson gave a focused voice
for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. In turn, the political backlash toward the President forced his
administration to consider ordering an immediate withdrawal.
U.S. Army brigadier General Wild Richardson arrived in Archangel on April 17, and
after evaluating the circumstances in Russia, he advised the War Department to withdraw all
American troops as quickly as possible. He believed that the American troops faced severe
fatigue due to the lack of reinforcements.92 After his recommendation, American troops finally
left the North Russian hell and returned home. In order to replace the 5000 American troops,
British reserves arrived in Archangel. Soon thereafter, the Bolsheviks overran their positions and
retook Murmansk and Archangel.
Now penned the "Polar Bears," troops arrived back home and reported that the press
vastly over exaggerated the mutiny. A soldier from Company I told the NY Times, "We kicked
like hell, but we didn't mutiny."93 The press confirmed that indeed no mutiny had occurred, but
the reports about the harsh British commanders and the troops yearning for an explanation of
why they fought in Russia were completely accurate. The troops ultimately felt that the
administration undermined their mission by limiting the amount of American troops in North
Russia and by failing to define their mission.
In conclusion, Wilson hoped that a small American expeditionary force that landed in
North Russia would spark a Russian revolt against the Soviets, whom he believed had been
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installed into power by Germany. This ultimately failed because the British command led the
expeditionary force on an offensive campaign in Russia. This offensive proved to be very
successful, however, because Wilson refused to send more troops to Russia, the offensive
operations ceased and the Soviets were able to regroup.
After the surrender of Germany, Wilson refused to signal a U.S. policy in Russia. The
American public began to wonder why American troops still fought on foreign soil. In turn, the
public pressured congress to order the President to withdraw U.S. troops. While this failed, it
gave the troops great anxiety as to why they were fighting, which ultimately led to the alleged
mutiny. The press spread the rumor that an alleged mutiny had occurred in North Russia. Senator
Johnson and the American public urged President Wilson to withdraw the expeditionary force
immediately. After immense pressure from the public and commanders on the ground, Wilson
ordered the withdrawal of United States forces from Russia, which allowed the Soviets to defeat
the allies resulting in the fall of Murmansk and Archangel.
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